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The District of Columbia Landlord and Tenant Court:
An Obsolete Structure in Need of Reformt
Robert M. McNamara, Jr.*
Introduction
In December of 1970, Hon. Harold H. Greene, Chief Judge of the District
of Columbia Superior Court, addressed the Young Lawyers Section of the
District of Columbia Bar Association and proposed the creation of a Land-
lord-Tenant Agency to handle more expeditiously and more equitably the
cases brought before the Landlord and Tenant Court.' This paper will
focus on the reasons underlying Judge Greene's proposal, the response it
generated, and the current status of the reorganization efforts.
The Background For Change
With rare unanimity, all of those who are in any way connected with or
come before the Landlord and Tenant Court-be they judges, tenants,
lawyers for either side, clerks, landlords or spectators-agree the court is
badly in need of reorganization of some sort. The criticisms of the present
structure range from the fact that it is too slow and inflexible to the
t The author wishes to express his appreciation to Ms. Nancy Wynstra, Director,
Planning and Research of the D.C. Superior Court, for her assistance and direction
in the preparation of this article.
* B.A., 1967, Mt. Carmel College; A.B., 1968, John Carrol University; J.D., 1973
Georgetown University. Presently serving as Law Clerk to Hon. George C. Edwards,
Jr., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Formerly served as management ana-
lyst and legal researcher for the D.C. Superior Court and worked on the proposal
dealt with in this article.
1. See Greene, A Proposal for The Establishment of a District of Columbia Land-
lord-Tenant Agency, D.C. Bar J., Jan.-June, 1971 at 26 (address given before the Young
Lawyers Sections of the District of Columbia Bar Association, December 23, 1970).
2. Presently, the cases are set for trial two weeks after the complaint is filed with
the clerk of the Landlord and Tenant court. However, unless a praecipe is entered
at that time, the landlord is rarely prepared to go forward at that time and will request
a continuance. A continuance is also requested when a housing code violation is ad-
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lack of judicial expertise and social realism.' Because of the phenomenal
number of cases filed each month,4 the court is pressured into disposing
of them as quickly as possible to avoid a logjam in the revolving door.,
Consequently, as one critic wrote: "The Landlord-Tenant Branch ... is
truly a rent collection agency."
6
vanced by the defense, in order that the landlord may check the validity of the claim.
See note 5 infra.
3. See note 5 infra. At present the judges are rotated every month through the
Landlord and Tenant court. Except for those who have developed expertise from prior
practice before the court or from a number of assignments to the court, the one month
period does not allow sufficient time to develop the in-depth knowledge of landlord-
tenant law necessary for adequate adjudication of the claims and defenses raised. The
criticism has been made that some of the judges sitting in Landlord and Tenant Court
have refused to follow appellate court decisions. Neighborhood Legal Services Pro-
gram's Report and Recommendations To Chief Judge Greene Concerning Reform of
Landlord and Tenant Court at 8 (July 28, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Neighborhood
Report]. Neighborhood Legal Services Program recommended a three to six months
rotation. Id. at 21.
4. In the calendar year 1971 there were approximately 10,000 cases filed per month.
Over the past six years the numbers have steadily increased.
CY'62 CY'66 CY'67 CY'68 CY'69 CY'70 CY'71
94,187 110,814 117,651 119,078 121,444 120,813 122,357
Part of the reason for such a large number of cases being filed is the almost auto-
matic filing procedure used by many of the large rental agencies as soon as the rent
is due. Knowing that it will be two weeks before the case is first heard, these com-
panies file complaints as insurance against the event of non-payment within that period
of time even if they know the rent will be paid. This idea is given some weight
by the number of complaints dismissed before judgment.
CY'62 CY'66 CY'67 CY'68 CY'69 CY'70 CY'71
21,875 27,012" 27,303" 29,198 30,621 33,621 39,607
[Statistics compiled by Mr. Jack Martin, Clerk of Landlord and Tenant Court, and
submitted June 9, 1972 to Chief Judge Greene.]
5. It has been suggested that landlords be required to wait until seven days after
the rent is due before filing. Letter of Mr. Frank Emmet to Chief Judge Greene,
February 18, 1971. The legality of this requirement would appear questionable since
technically speaking landlords have an immediate right to the rent, and such a require-
ment may operate as an unconstitutional denial of access to the courts. One company
has experimented with such a system, but discontinued the procedure since they found
they were losing more money than before. A number of landlords interviewed stated
that many tenants look upon the summons and complaint as nothing more than a
final notice to pay. This may be borne out by the fact that many of those sued
in Landlord and Tenant Court are multiple repeaters. Investigations uncovered one
instance where a tenant had been sued for non-payment of rent every month for the
past twelve years.
6. TAUBs, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LANDLORD-TENANT COURT 3 (1967) (this
report was prepared for the Washington Planning and Housing Association and
Yale Law School). Ms. Taub reflected the general feeling about the court when
she wrote:
The initial encounter with this process is distressing, if not shocking. The
small part played by the tenant in this automatic processing suggests that the
tenant is being treated without elemental fairness; while the small part played
by the judge suggests that the judicial system is completely irrelevant.
Id. at 2. This same opinion was recently echoed in an article by B.D. Colen entitled
Busy Landlord-Tenant Court: Inefficient Collection Agency:
Although it was established for the swift legal settlement of disputes between
rental housing owners and their tenants, D.C. Superior Court's landlord and
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It was against this background of inefficient travesty, as well as the fact
that the entire court system was preparing to undergo a vast reorganization, 7
that Judge Greene initiated what he had hoped would be a community re-
sponse to remedy the Landlord and Tenant Court situation. The proposal,
which was nothing more than a general plan, envisioned an independent,
self-contained agency which would have its own investigative and legal
staff. Attached to the Mayor's Office rather than the judiciary, the body
would have appropriate fact-finding power and decisional authority, sub-
ject only to narrow review by the courts." In addition to passing on evic-
tions for non-payment of rent, the agency would determine whether a de-
fense based on housing code violations existed, conciliate housing disputes,
conduct broad-ranged studies of housing and code enforcement problems,
and conduct a thorough review of the housing code with the aim of prepar-
ing recommendations for legislative action.9
The advantages of such an agency were apparent. It would consolidate
the efforts of many other agencies that focused some, if not all, of their ef-
forts upon landlord-tenant problems. By applying well-defined expertise
to these problems, this consolidation would hopefully result in greater ef-
ficiency of operation and a fairer determination of the issues involved.
Affirmative actions by tenants for housing code violations were also a possi-
bility, so long as the agency could enforce the sanctions it imposed.
At that time, one of the reasons for hesitancy in implementing such a pro-
posal was the uncertainty surrounding the constitutional right to a jury trial
in landlord-tenant cases.10 It was thought at the time that so long as a
tenant branch has over the years become an inefficient, overloaded, slow-
moving collection agency for landlords.
The Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1954, § D, at 1, col. 1.
7. This reorganization was codified in The District of Columbia Court Reorganiza-
tion Act of July 29, 1970, P.L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 482. The Court was renamed from
the Court of General Sessions and was divided into five divisions: criminal, civil, tax,
probate and family. See D.C. CODE § 11-902 (Supp. V, 1972).
8. Greene, supra note 1, at 29-30.
9. Id. at 30-32.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VII:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury, shall otherwise be reexamined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of common law.
Prior to the decision in Pernell v. Southall Realty, 294 A.2d 490 (D.C. App. 1972),
see infra note 11 and accompanying text, the Superior Court was split as to the ex-
istence of a right to a trial by jury in suits for possession under D.C. CODE § 16-
1501 (Supp. V, 1972). See L & S Investment Co. v. Anderson, 99 D.W.L.R. 1169
(D.C. Super. Ct., June 16, 1971) and Urciolo v. Evans and Davis v. Hunter, 99
D.W.L.R. 1729 (D.C. Super. Ct., Sept. 14, 1971), holding a right to trial by jury
to exist. A contrary holding was reached in Hair v. Cooper, 99 D.W.L.R. 1569 (D.C.
Super. Ct., Aug. 23, 1971) and Silvey v. Snyder, 99 D.W.L.R. 1569 (D.C. Super. Ct.,
Aug. 23, 1971). For an excellent discussion of Judge Braman's well-reasoned opinion
in Urciolo, see 60 GEo. L.J. 799 (1972).
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right to a trial de novo was preserved, the agency concept might still be
legally permissible; yet it was also feared that the only effect of such a
provision would be to create just one more bureaucratic hurdle before al-
lowing a person into court. This question, however, has been at least tem-
porarily resolved by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision in
Pernell v. Southall Realty" which held that no such right exists absent an
authorizing statute.
Aside from the constitutional considerations, Judge Greene's proposal
received criticism from numerous community groups. It should be pointed
out that Judge Greene himself was not wholeheartedly in favor of the
agency, but saw it only as one of many possible alternatives to the present
system, and he hoped that by proposing one alternative, it would have the
effect of initiating constructive and perhaps creative response. As it turned
out, only three community groups came forward with recommendations,
and only one of those merited serious consideration.
The Real Property Law Committee of the District of Columbia Bar As-
sociation (made up mostly of landlords' lawyers) passed a resolution,
which was unanimously adopted, that the forum for landlord and tenant
disputes should remain within the present system.12  The proposal of the
Bar Association committee was that a Review Section be established in the
Landlord and Tenant Court composed of examiners who would have full
fact-finding power, but who would defer to the court matters of law per-
taining to the individual cases. This recommendation was more in the
form of a suggestion as it was not accompanied by detailed research deal-
ing with the obvious problems of powers, duties, and jurisdiction, nor was
any case made by the committee for the implementation of such a proposal.
The Housing Court
Judge Greene's proposal for the Landlord-Tenant Agency was referred to
the District of Columbia City Council which appointed an advisory com-
11. 294 A.2d 490 (D.C. App. 1972). Relying on the opinion of Mr. Justice Gray
in Capital Traction v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1898), the court in Pernell rejected Judge
Braman's conclusion in Urciolo, stating that "[i]n our view, Hof shatters the picture
of a continuous history of jury trials protected by the seventh amendment in summary
landlord-tenant possession cases since the founding of the District." 294 A.2d at 495.
It also appears that the implications of a finding that there was a right to a trial
by jury would be such as to preclude possible court reform as was proposed by Chief
Judge Greene, supra note 1. See 294 A.2d at 499. The issue, however, is not yet
dead since it is presently on appeal to the Supreme Court. Pernell v. Southhall Realty,
supra note 10, cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3527 (April 3, 1973).
12. See Letter to Chief Judge Harold Greene from Mr. Geofrey L. Munter, Chair-
man, Real Property Law Committee, March 12, 1971. The Real Property Committee
also made a recommendation for the establishment of a "Review Section", however,
the Committee did not communicate its reasons either for the recommendation for the
Review Section or against the proposal of the Chief Judge.
[Vol. 23:275
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mission on landlord-tenant relations to study the proposal and report its
findings and recommendations to the Council. The Advisory Commission
recommended against the establishment of such an agency and proposed in
its stead the establishment of a Housing Court.
13
The main objections of the Commission were both practical and tradi-
tional in nature:
Apart from the practicalities of creating and funding an admini-
strative agency, we firmly believe that the public, landlords as
well as tenants, will continue to rely upon the courts for justice.
Additionally, ultimate appeal to the court system from an ad-
ministrative agency would have to be allowed, and where agency
procedures were initially incorrect, valuable time might be wast-
ed.14
The Commission found many problems existing in the present system which
it felt must be remedied:
1. that the present Landlord-Tenant Court system operates too slowly in
in many cases. Often the owner's right to possession is unreasonably de-
layed because the tenant has demanded a jury trial, regardless of the
merits of his defense;
2. that the landlords' attorneys' fees and court costs are a considerable
operating expense ultimately paid by the tenants;
3. that the present system is too complex for a tenant to make his defense
successfully without an attorney or expert witness;
4. that the present system of rotating judges in Landlord-Tenant Court
every thirty days prevents judges from developing expertise in the hous-
ing area;
5. that the dependence of judges in the Landlord-Tenant Court on the
testimony of each side's witnesses makes it difficult for the judges to
determine the causation of property conditions or the reduction in rental
value caused by these conditions;
6. that the present system is too rigid and limited in the kind of disputes
that can be heard;
7. that the Housing Regulations do not distinguish sufficiently between
major and minor code violations;
8. that the present system does not deal effectively with those aspects
13. See District of Columbia City Council Landlord-Tenant Advisory Committee:
Findings and Recommendations Relating to Resolution of Landlord-Tenant Disputes
(appended to Letter to Chief Judge Harold Greene from Mr. J. Kirkwood White, Ex-
ecutive Assistant to the Vice-Chairman), August 4, 1971 [hereinafter cited as City
Council Memo].
14. Id. at 2.
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of the landlord-tenant relationship which might require judicial super-
vision, such as abandoned buildings or poor housekeeping by tenants;
and
9. that the present system does not have the flexibility to handle the tre-
mendous variety of disputes that come before it, nor does it have
enough appropriate remedies.
Concluding its findings, the Commission stated: "[W]e are convinced that
the current judicial mechanism must be thoroughly revised, improved and
expanded to deal promptly and fairly with the wide range of disputes which
arise between landlords and tenants."' 1
The criticisms generally voiced were adequately echoed by the Commis-
sion's findings. 16 In line with its recommendation for a thorough revi-
15. Id. at 3.
16. The District of Columbia is not the only jurisdiction which has recently at-
tempted to reorganize its landlord-tenant courts in order to deal with housing matters
more fairly and expeditiously. Three of the surrounding jurisdictions have taken ac-
tion in this area. Montgomery County, Maryland, was the first to pass a landlord-
tenant law, which was vetoed by its County Executive; the veto was overridden later
by the Council. The Washington Post, Oct. 7, 1972, § B, at 2, cols. 3-8. The new
law set up a nine-member commission which had powers to investigate landlord-tenant
disputes, issue cease-and-desist orders, apply fines and damages where the situation
warranted such, and revoke licenses. The law also codified case law defining the
rights of tenants. The law was effectively emasculated three weeks after it went
into effect by Judge John Moore in a test case, Investors Funding Corporation v. Mont-
gomery County, Eq. No. 44,380 (Md. Cir. Ct., Mont. Co., 1972), in which certain sec-
tions were held to be unconstitutional. See also The Washington Post, Oct. 17, 1972,
§ B, at 1, col. 8. The constitutional deficiencies found by Judge Moore included
the lack of procedural due process hearings, slip op. at 9, the unconstitutional delega-
tion of judicial authority, id. at 14, and the impairment of contract, id. at 15. The
landlord-tenant law was considered vital by the Council, and they have indicated that
an appeal of the ruling would be forthcoming. The Washington Post, Nov. 1, 1972,
§ B, at 1, col. 4.
Prince George's County, Maryland, has also enacted a similar bill which is to
become effective July 1, 1973. It too set up a landlord-tenant office charged with
investigating complaints and issuing orders. The bill further provided a codification
of tenant and landlord rights as well as a grievance procedure. See The Washington
Post, Nov. 28, 1972, § A, at 1, col. 1. The landlords, however, plan to challenge
this law as soon as it goes into effect. id. § A, at 6, col. 1.
Fairfax County, Viriginia, has drafted a housing ordinance which it planned to
submit to the County Board of Supervisors after the first of the year. It is somewhat
duplicative in draft form of the provisions mentioned above, but also provides an added
right not to be evicted so long as the tenant pays his rent and abides by the lease
agreement. The Washington Post, § D, at 1, cols. 6-7. Landlords anticipate a court
battle over this provision as well. Id. § D, at 4, col. 1.
The Council of Governments (COG) has been concerned for some time about the
plight of tenants in the metropolitan area, and has conducted extensive studies of the
problem throughout the area. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF GOvERNMENTS, STuDY OF LAND-
LORD-TENANT RELATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE METROPOLITAN AREA,
(Preliminary Draft, July 9, 1971). The COG recommended that there be an area-
wide ordinance, a licensing of rental facilities, annual inspections, creation of a land-
lord-tenant commission, and the adoption of a model lease. Id. at 14-15. The Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has also attempted to deal
Landlord Tenant Court
sion, the Commission proposed two measures: the establishment of a Hous-
ing Court and a revision of the Housing Regulations.
17
The Housing Court, as envisioned by the Commission, would have juris-
diction over civil actions involving real property as well as over criminal
prosecutions brought pursuant to the Housing Code. Judges would be
specially assigned to the court for an extended period of time, thus enabl-
ing them to develop an expertise in the area of landlord-tenant law. The
Commission's proposal contemplated the use of hearing examiners, appointed
by the court, who would conduct the initial proceedings in the civil cases.
The examiner would have the authority to enter judgment where no legal
defense had been raised. In a case where a defense had been raised, he
would make an initial determination concerning the amount of rent to be
paid into the registry of the court preceding and during the litigation phase.
The hearing examiner could also order an investigation of the property
involved in litigation to be conducted by court investigators or court as-
signed housing inspectors. If the parties agreed, the examiner could also
refer cases to a court arbitration-mediation service or refer tenants in need
of assistance to the Social Services Agency. In all other situations, cases
not resolved at this stage would be certified for trial.
The Commission also proposed that the Housing Court have the power
to impose fines against landlords or tenants for violations of the Housing
Regulations, that the tenant have the right to initiate the escrow of rents,
with the court deciding what percentage should be used for repairs, and
that the court have the authority to appoint a receiver for abandoned prop-
ty. I18
The initial problem in establishing a Housing Court is one of authority.
It was suggested during a preliminary study of the Commission's proposal
that this could be accomplished only by legislation.' 9 Such would be the
with this problem on a nationwide basis. See UNIFORM LANDLORD AND TENANT RE-
LATIONSHIP ACT (3rd Working Draft April, 1972).
17. The City Council recommended that the "regulations be revised to weigh the
relative severity of various code violations." Beyond this and a few simple changes
relating to access by the landlord, notice by the tenant, and notice of abatement of
violations, the City Council did not delineate specific revisions. See City Council Memo,
supra note 13, at 6-7. Compare STUDY OF LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE METROPOLITAN AREA and UNIFORM LANDLORD AND TEN-
ANT RELATIONSmP ACT, supra note 16.
18. City Council Memo, supra note 13, at 5-6.
19. See Letter to Chief Judge Harold Greene from Ms. Nancy Wynstra, Director,
Division of Planning and Research, D.C. Superior Court, dated November 21, 1971.
This position was advanced during hearings on the proposal before the Special Sub-
committee on Landlord-Tenant Rules appointed by Chief Judge Greene, and it appeared
to the author at the time of his testimony that the panel of judges concurred with
this conclusion.
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case certainly if any attempts were to be made to confer both civil and
criminal jurisdiction upon the Housing Court, since Congress only recently
had separated the courts and its divisions along the lines of jurisdiction of
subject matter. 20  Thus, it was doubtful that Congress could be persuaded
to grant dual jurisdiction to a Housing Court this soon after the Court Re-
form Act.21 Additionally, the Chief Judge wanted to avoid having to wait
for Congress to act before any reform of the court could be accomplished
as nearly a year and a half had already passed since he first proposed the
Landlord-Tenant Agency. A further consideration was that if any proposal
were to be implemented within the next fiscal year, a budget submission
would have to be made later that same summer. A decision was made at
the time that whatever proposal was finally accepted it would have to be one
which could be implemented without recourse to Congress and be within
the powers already conferred to the court by the Court Reform Act. Conse-
quently, it was decided that the Housing Court would not have any crim-
inal jurisdiction, but that possible recourse could later be had to the City
Council to establish new civil penalties which would make such jurisdiction
unnecessary.
22
Under the Court Reform Act, Congress defined the divisions of the Su-
perior Court, but also allowed for those divisions to be subdivided into what-
ever branches the Court needed.23  This would allow for the creation of a
Housing Court branch under the civil division, and this branch would have
jurisdiction over all housing matters as defined by the Board of Judges. 24
20. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
21. There has been some discussion within the past few years regarding the value
of criminal sanctions in housing matters. It has been suggested that such sanctions
be abolished and replaced by civil penalties, reasoning that economic offenses require
economic sanctions. These sanctions would, however, need to be more than a slap-
on-the-wrist type of penalty. See generally Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforce-
ment: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1286-88 (1966); Sax & Hie-
stand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MIcH. L. REV. 869, 871-73 (1967); Note, Enforce-
ment of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REV. 801, 820-30 (1965). Considera-
tion should possibly be given to a greater use of injunctions, orders to vacate, manda.
tory civil penalties and receivership proceedings. See, e.g., N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW
§ 309 (McKinney Supp. 1972); ILL. STAT. ANr'N. ch. 24, § 11-31-1 et seq. (Supp.
1972). The ineffectiveness of criminal sanctions is perhaps best expressed by the fact
that in 1971, of the 184 cases referred to the D.C. Corporation Council's Office by
the Housing Division of the Division of Licenses and Inspections for prosecution of
code violations, only 15 cases received any judicial attention, and most of these re-
ceived only a fine.
22. See Gribetz & Grad, supra note 21, for a similar proposal of a Civil Housing
Court which would have jurisdiction almost identical to that proposed by the City Coun-
cil.
23. D.C. CODE § 11-902 (Supp. V, 1972) states that "[t]he divisions of the Superior
Court may be divided into such branches as the Superior Court may by rule prescribe."
24. The jurisdiction of the Housing Court over all housing matters could be defined




Admittedly, this would appear to do nothing more than change the name of
the present Landlord and Tenant branch, however, the underlying premise
was that eventually the Housing Court would take jurisdiction over all hous-
ing matters once City Council had enacted the necessary legislation.
The jurisdictional problems, however, were not the major hurdles which
had to be overcome in order to implement some sort of reorganization.
The role of the hearing examiner and the basis for his power was a more
crucial concern. Initially, the hearing examiner's position was seen essen-
tially as an administrative one, and the delineation of his duties could be
done by the Board of Judges through their rule-making power.25  It was
later decided that a fuller utilization of the examiner should be attempted
since both the City Council and the District of Columbia Bar Committee
had suggested that he be given substantial power. Such a position was
analogized to the role of the master in both the federal judicial system as
well as the Superior Court.26  Congress had already established positions
for various court personnel in the Court Reform Act, and one of these
provisions, 11 D.C. Code § 1724, provided that:
There shall be an Auditor-Master of the Superior Court who shall
(1) audit and state fiduciary accounts, (2) execute orders of ref-
erence referred by the Superior Court and perform duties in con-
nection with the execution of such orders in accordance with
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or other appli-
cable rule, and (3) perform such other functions as may be assigned
by the Superior Court .... 27
Section 11-1724 specifies two unrelated duties of the Auditor-Master and
includes a third "catch-all" duty which should probably be interpreted to
include duties collateral to or within the general scope of the first two func-
tions. However, this provision is susceptible to much broader interpreta-
tion. The functions of the hearing examiner would more closely fall within
the second duty, since the powers of a master with the scope of a referee
... The Superior Court may adopt and enforce other rules as it may deem
necessary without the approval of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals if
such rules do not modify the Federal Rules [of Civil and Criminal Pro-
cedure] ...
25. An analogous situation presently operates in the Family Division. See
SCR-General Family D, which authorizes the Chief Judge to appoint one or more per-
sons to serve as hearing officers on a full or part-time basis. Compare SCR-Small
Claims 1-5 which provides for the mechanics of arbitration in Small Claims court.
However, there exists specific statutory authorization for this court rule in D.C. CODE §
11-1322 (Supp. V, 1972).
26. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is identical to SCR-Rule 53,
except for the provisions in SCR-Rule 53-I and Rule 53-11 which provide for an
auditor-master. This position is also provided for in D.C. CODE § 11-1724 (Supp. V,
1972). See text at note 9 for a more complete discussion.
27. D.C. CODE § 11-1724 (Supp. V, 1972).
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are closely analogous to the powers and duties which are contemplated
for the hearing examiner. The duties are compatible, within the required
expertise of the auditor-master and, depending on the number of orders of
reference made by the court, could be performed by one person. The main
consideration was, however, whether the court would want the auditor-mas-
ter to exercise the duties of a hearing examiner for the Landlord-Tenant
court. As was then envisioned, this would be a full-time job, depending
upon the assigned duties and delegated powers.
An alternative source of authority was section 1725(b) which allowed for
the appointment of "all other non-judicial personnel for the courts . . .
as may be necessary . . . "28 subject only to the regulations approved by
the Joint Committee and the approval of the Chief Judge of the court to
which the personnel are or will be assigned.29  Given the general tenor and
scope of the Court Reform Act, the position of hearing examiner would
seem to fall better within the purview of this section since his function is
certainly seen as necessary and directly relates to the more effective ad-
ministration of the court.
Section 11-1725(b) authorizing the appointment of other non-judicial
personnel is merely a codification of a power which the courts have al-
ways had. As early as 1920, the Supreme Court in the case of In re Peter-
son stated that the "Courts have (at least in the absence of legislation to
the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instru-
ments required for the performance of their duties."30  The Court went on
to say that:
This power includes authority to appoint persons unconnected
with the court to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial
duties, as they may arise in the progress of a cause. From the
commencement of our government it has been exercised by the
federal courts, when sitting in equity, by appointing, either with
or without the consent of the parties, special masters, auditors,
examiners, and commissioners. To take and report testimony,
to audit and state accounts, to make computations, to determine
where the facts are complicated and the evidence voluminous,
what questions are actually in issue, to hear conflicting evidence
and make findings thereon; these are among the purposes for
which such aids to the judges have been appointed. Whether
such aid shall be sought is ordinarily within the discretion of the
28. Id. at § 11-1725(b).
29. It is unclear what the precise scope of "all other non-judicial personnel for
the courts . . . as may be necessary" was intended to be by Congress. Since the lan-
guage is susceptible of a broad interpretation, it was given such, but it is also possible
that the language was meant to refer only to the necessary supportive staff.
30. 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920).
[Vol. 23:275
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trial judge; but this Court has indicated that where accounts are
complex and intricate, or where the documents or other evidence
voluminous, or where extensive computations are to be made,
it is the better practice to refer the matter to a special master or com-
missioner than for the judge to undertake to perform the task him-
self. (citation omitted) 81
The powers delineated in Peterson are substantial, however, it should be
pointed out that the function which the auditor in Peterson served was es-
sentially that now provided for in Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court took notice of this when it pointed out the fact
that because of the complex nature of the case, the "judge would be unable
to perform his duty of defining to the jury the issues submitted for their
determination and of directing their attention to the matters actually in
issue" without the assistance of the auditor.
32
In addition to the "inherent power" theory, courts have always been
competent to make and enforce reasonable rules regulating the practice of
cases pending before them.88 In some jurisdictions this power has been
conferred either by constitutional provisions or by statute. However, courts
have likewise stated that they have inherent power to prescribe such rules
of procedure and practice as may be necessary for the proper administration
of justice.8 4  The rules of the court, if properly promulgated and within
the power of the court have the force of law.35  The Superior Court has
been given this rulemaking power by Congress, subject to the approval
of the D.C. Court of Appeals, only if such a rule or rules would modify
the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure.
3 6
It was in light of this rulemaking power that the third alternative, that of
providing a master for the Housing Court was advanced. Superior Court
Rule 53(a) allows for the appointment of one or more standing masters
31. Id. at 312-13.
32. Id. at 313-14. The Court later referred again to the special nature of this
appointment when it spoke of "complicated questions of fact [referred] to a person
specially appointed." Id.
33. See generally 20 AM. JuR. 2d Courts § 82 (1965).
34. See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909). While the Court addressed itself specifi-
cally to the "full faith and credit" aspect of an in rem proceeding, it appears to
have accepted without comment the use of a commissioner to determine the just dis-
position of property in a divorce proceeding. For other cases discussing the rulemak-
ing power of the courts, see generally Washington-Southern Navigation Company v.
Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Company, 263 U.S. 629 (1924); Barber Asphalt
Paving Company v. Standard Asphalt & Rubber Company, 275 U.S. 372 (1928); Bronx
Brass Foundry, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., Trustee, 297 U.S. 230 (1936).
35. See Weil v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160 (1929). A rule of court can neither enlarge
nor restrict the jurisdiction of the court, United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584
(1941), nor can it abrogate or modify substantive law. Washington-Southern Naviga-
tion Company v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Company, 263 U.S. 629 (1924).
36. D.C. CODE § 11-946 (Supp. V, 1972).
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and the appointment of a special master. Rule 53(b) defines the order of
reference to such a master:
A reference to a Master shall be the exception and not the rule.
In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only
when the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without
a jury, save in matters of account and of difficult computation
of damages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing
that some exceptional condition requires it.
The plain meaning of the language would appear to discount immediately
the possibility of this provision having any application to the Housing Court.
It was suggested that the present Landlord and Tenant Court problem as a
whole was exceptional, and thus would fall within the Rule.37  However,
the applicable case law requires that an "exceptional condition" must exist
within the individual action and not by virtue of a general logjam in the
court.38 This is especially true since specific orders of reference must be
given in each case, detailing in clear and specific terms the matters to be
passed upon by the Master. Nevertheless, as brought out during hearings
on the proposal in early December of 1972, this problem in application
might easily be resolved by removing the word "exceptional" from the provi-
sion thus allowing for a much broader application. This would require
recourse to the rule-making power of the court pursuant to § 11-94639 as
a provision could be included to provide for a hearing examiner or special
master in the Housing Court. 40
Powers and Duties of the Hearing Examiner
As a rule, no effort is made in state constitutions or in the Federal Constitu-
tion to define the scope of judicial powers with any degree of precision.
Such powers are generally determined in light of the common law and
the history of the various courts. Generally, a judicial inquiry investigates,
37. This position was adopted by Mr. Joseph Schneider during a meeting of land-
lords and their attorneys with Chief Judge Harold Greene on July 5, 1972. The same
position was advanced by Mr. Curt von Kann, who had served on the Landlord-Tenant
Rules Subcommittee, in an interview with the author.
38. Cases stressing the exceptional character of a cause of action before reference
to a master can be made are LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); Bart-
lett-Collins Co. v. Surinam Navigation Company, 381 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1967); Mc-
Graw-Edison Co. v. Central Transformer Corp., 308 F.2d 70 (8th Cir. 1962) (unneces-
sary appointment of master may amount to denial of due process); Burgess v. Wil-
liams, 302 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1962); In re Watkins, 271 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1959);
Rogers v. Societe Internationale, Etc., 278 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Schwimmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956). See
aleo 5A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACcE § 53.05 (1971) and cases cited therein.
39. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
40. At present SCR-Rule 53 applies to Landlord and Tenant proceedings by virtue
of SCR-LT Rule 2 (1971).
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declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on the facts and under the
law.41  While a judge may not delegate his duties in such a manner as to
deprive the parties of their basic rights, this does not prevent him from ap-
pointing another person to aid him in the exercise of his duties. Thus in
Peterson, the Court held that reference to an auditor did not operate
as an unconstitutional deprivation of the right to a jury trial since the auditor's
findings were not final but only tentative. 42  The Court stated that sev-
enth amendment problems prohibit the agent of the judge from exercising
any greater power.
The Court reaffirmed this in United States v. Wood:
In construing the seventh amendment . . . we have said that
the aim of the amendment was "to preserve the substance of the
common law right of trial by jury as distinguished from mere
matters of form or procedure." ( Citations omitted). We held
in Ex Parte Peterson . . . that there was no constitutional obstacle
to the appointment by a federal court of an auditor in aid of
jury trials although the practice in question had not obtained prior
to the adoption of the Constitution either in England or in the
colonies in connection with trial by jury.43
The Wood Court, quoting from Peterson, stated, "[N]ew devices may be
used to adapt the ancient institution to present needs and to make of it an
efficient instrument in the administration of justice. Indeed, such changes
are essential to the preservation of the right."
'44
In light of this language, it would appear that the hearing examiner
could have all powers to hear evidence, subpoena witnesses, and make pre-
liminary findings of fact and tenative conclusions or recommendations of
law, short of actually determining the case. These are essentially the powers
of a master under Rule 53, pursuant to statute, and as specifically defined
by the appointing judge. Because of Rule 53(c), such a delegation of power
would not be unconstitutional per se. 45 It would appear that, with the re-
writing of the present Rule as suggested, and with the powers of the exam-
41. See generally Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150 (1913); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line, 211 U.S. 210 (1908); Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878).
42. 253 U.S. 300, 314 (1920). See also Field v. Holland, 6 Cranch 8, 21 (1810)
("[the auditors] do not decree, but prepare material on which a decree is made.");
Railroad Co. v. Swasey, 23 Wall. 405, 410 (1874) ("[the auditor's] office is to present
the case to the court in such a manner that intelligent action may be there had,
and it is this action by the court, not the report, that finally determines the rights
of the parties.").
43. 299 U.S. 123, 143 (1936).
44. Id. at 143-44.
45. An analogous situation exists in the District Court's use of the pre-trial ex-
aminer, apparently employed under the authority of D.C. CODE § 11-501 (1967):
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia may appoint an
auditor for the court, a messenger for each judge, and all of the officers of
the court necessary for the due administration of justice.
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iner clearly and specifically delineated, the role of a hearing examiner would
be the same as the role of an auditor-master in an order of reference.
Furthermore, landlord and tenant matters, are by their nature already
narrowly defined, encompassing only suits for possession and the recog-
nized legal defenses thereto,46 thus the traditional role of a master would be
maintained.
Operation of the System
The proposed process would begin with the filing of the complaint by the land-
lord. 47  At that time a hearing date would be set approximately two weeks
from the date of filing to allow for service upon the tenant.48  During that
time, the parties may request either arbitration 49 or mediation, and may
suggest either a mutually acceptable arbitrator or mediator, or agree to
have the hearing examiner fulfill this function. This type of procedure
would probably be most effectively utilized in a rent strike situation. 0
46. One of the main concerns voiced at the numerous meetings held with various
individuals directly or indirectly connected with the Landlord and Tenant Court and
its problems was the question of who the person would be filling the spot and what
his or her qualifications would be. While the research staff felt that the question
was premature, since the qualifications would depend on the amount and scope of au-
thority and responsibility defined only after the jurisdictional problems had been
solved, it was indicative of the concerns which these persons felt to be most pressing.
47. It has been suggested that there be a delay period between the date the rent
is due and the time of filing to prevent the "automatic filing procedure." But see
the discussion supra note 5. See also Cohen, "Busy Landlord-Tenant Court: Ineffi-
cient Collection Agency," The Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1972, § D, at 1, col. 1. The
complaint procedure, filing and hearing would presumably also apply to affirmative
suits by tenants should the D.C. City Council amend the present Housing Regulations
so as to provide only civil sanctions. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
48. It has been suggested that service be accomplished by either registered mail
or certified mail, however, this would require a change in the Rules of the Landlord
and Tenant Court since SCR-LT Rule 4 (1971) provides for personal service by a U.S.
Marshall or a "process server." The sham of the D.C. summons procedure was re-
cently exposed by the Washington Post in a series of articles detailing the abuse. See
The Washington Post, Jan. 29, 1973, § A, at 1, col. 5; id. at 11, col. 1. The follow-
ing day an article appeared in the Post stating that both the U.S. Attorney's Office
and the D.C. Superior Court had initiated an investigation of the abuse. The problem
with adequate service may account in large part for the unusually high number of
default judgments entered pursuant to SCR-LT Rule 3 (1971). The statistics from
the Clerk of the Landlord and Tenant Court show:
Year # Complaints Filed # Default Judgments Percent
1962 94,187 63,190 64.9
1966 110,814 74,945 66.7
1967 117,651 80,269 68.2
1968 119,078 81,412 68.4
1969 121,444 79,637 65.6
1970 120,813 74,980 62.1
1971 122,357 71,570 58.5
49. See generally Sembower, Landlord and Tenant Arbitration, 24 Aa. J. 35 (1969).
50. One author recently questioned whether the "rent strike" should be institution-
alized. See Johnson, Collective Tenant Action: Should the Rent Strike Be Institution-
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The normal case would come before the hearing examiner on the set
date, at which time the tenant would be interviewed by a paraprofessional in-
take worker who had a specialized knowledge of the landlord and tenant
law. The paraprofessional would elicit basic background information:
whether the tenant had paid the rent, what reasons he may have had for
not paying the rent, whether there would be any housing code violations
(using a checklist procedure) and whether there may be any legal defenses.
Once this had been completed, the tenant would appear before the hearing
examiner. Also present would be the landlord's attorney and a Legal Serv-
ices Attorney assigned for that day.5'
At this juncture a number of alternatives could arise:
(1) If there were no legal defenses, no housing code violations and
no extenuating circumstances, the examiner could order eviction or pay-
ment, whichever remedy the landlord had demanded in his complaint; 52
(2) if there were no legal defenses, no housing code violations and no
extenuating circumstances other than the agreement by the tenant to pay
if given a few days, and this was agreeable to the landlord, a praecipe
could be entered to that effect;
(3) if there were no legal defenses, no housing code violations, but
there were extenuating social circumstances, such as a lost welfare check,
the case would be immediately referred to the Landlord and Tenant Consul-
tant Service for the appropriate action.
53
alized? 46 L.A.B. BULL. 138 (1971). Oftentimes rent strikes or rent withholding are
the only means available to the tenant to protest against the conditions of his hous-
ing. See Comment, Rent Withholding: The Tenant's Remedy Against Unfit Housing, 10
J. FAMILY LAw 481 (1971). See also Schwab, The War on Slums: Rent Withholding
as a Weapon, 57 ILL. B.J. 920 (1969); Note, Rent Withholding: A New Approach
to Landlord-Tenant Problems, 2 LOYOLA U.L. REV. 105 (1969). The effectiveness
of individual tenant rent withholding is questionable unless the court recognizes a
Brown-Javins defense as valid. See Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968).
But see Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) which provides that states need
not allow such defenses to be raised in an eviction proceeding since the tenant had
other adequate civil remedies. Perhaps the strongest bargaining power tenants have
is through tenant unions which have received a considerable amount of attention. See
generally Moskovitz & Honigsberg, Tenant Union-Landlord Relations Act: A Pro-
posal, 58 GEO. L.J. 1013 (1970); Note, Tenant Unions: Their Law and Operation in
the State and Nation, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 79 (1970); Note, Tenant Unions: Collective
Bargaining and the Low Income Tenant, 77 YALE L.J. 1368 (1968).
51. It is possible that the tenant may not have to appear if he or she has retained
counsel or an NSLP attorney is prepared to represent the tenant at the hearing. It
is not an unusual proposition since the landlord himself rarely appears, and is repre-
sented only by his lawyer who verifies the pleadings and any other information his
records may contain.
52. See supra note 47. Cf. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
53. The Landlord-Tenant Consultant Service (LTCS) was originally set up as a
demonstration project by the Washington Planning and Housing Agency and the
1973]
Catholic University Law Review
(4) if there were no legal defenses, yet there was a possibility of a
housing code violation, the nature and extent of which appeared substantial
after questioning by not only the hearing examiner, but also the Legal Serv-
ices attorney and the landlord attorney, a housing inspector, attached to
the hearing examiner's office, would be immediately sent out to investi-
gate and report back to the hearing examiner within 24 hours;
(5) if legal defenses (other than ones involving housing code viola-
tions) were raised, such as retaliatory eviction, 54 the case would be certi-
fied for trial at the earliest possible date. (It is possible that the Legal Services
attorney would know this beforehand, and upon his representation at the
time of the hearing it could be certified without need for the tenant to be
present at the hearing.)
It should be stated that since the hearing is not a formal adversary pro-
ceeding, the attorneys for both sides, with the hearing examiner, would be
allowed to ask questions to elicit information from the tenant necessary for
a fair determination and appropriate disposition.
In situations #1 and #2 above, the matter would terminate with the hear-
ing. In situation #3, Landlord and Tenant Consultant Service would be
expected to return a recommendation for appropriate action to the exam-
iner who would enter a final recommendation to the effect, unless opposed
by the landlord's attorney. In the latter case, a suitable agreement would be
attempted by the hearing examiner. In a case where the landlord's attorney
League of Women Voters in 1940. It began to function as a public agency in 1941
after the Commissioners recommended that the funds necessary for its operation be
included in the budget for the Board of Public Welfare. At present, LTCS is part
of the Division of Special Resources-Family and Children Division of the Department
of Human Resources.
The present staff of nine has a working knowledge of the regulations and laws
relating to housing in the District of Columbia; acts as an advisor and conciliator for
the Landlord and Tenant Court; and renders advice on cases requiring a social disposi-
tion before the court. LTCS also serves as an intermediary by attempting to arrange
out-of-court settlements in cases where installment payments of rent in arrears can
be made. Because of its connection with the Department of Human Resources, LTCS
has a good accessibility to various community resources, and thus can expedite refer-
rals for immediate actions. However, due to its small staff, LTCS has been able to
handle only about two percent of all cases filed in Landlord and Tenant Court (above
five percent of the non-default judgment cases). The staffing proposal for the reorga-
nization of the Landlord and Tenant Court included an expansion of the LTCS staff.
54. In the District of Columbia such a procedure is forbidden both by case law,
Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968) and by the housing regulations.
HOUSING REGULATIONS OF THE DismICr OF COLUMBIA § 2910, Comm'r Order No.
70-220, enacted June 12, 1970. Retaliatory evictions have generated a good deal of
legal analysis and discussion. See generally Note, Retaliatory Eviction as a Defense
to Unlawful Detainer-Alternative Approaches? 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1365 (1971); Note,
Landlord and Tenant-The Burden of Proof Required to Establish Defense of Retaliatory
Eviction, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 939, 3 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 193 (1970);
44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 286 (1968).
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opposed any agreement, the examiner would enter his final recommenda-
tion, and allow the landlord's attorney and a Legal Services attorney to ap-
pear that afternoon before the judge for a final ruling on the matter. In
cases of no opposition, a praecipe would be entered by the parties and the
case would be terminated.
In situation #4, where there was some evidence of a housing code viola-
tion which was not de minimis, and a housing inspector had been sent
out, his report would be reviewed by the examiner the next day. If there
were no violations, or the violations were such as not to be sufficient to war-
rant an abatement, 55 the parties would be notified immediately to appear
in court the following day, at which time a praecipe or order would be
entered. The second- hearing date could possibly be set at the time the
housing violation was first raised.
In the event that a violation was found, the case would both be referr-
ed to the code enforcement section for action and the parties would be
notified of a trial date, which could have been set at the first hearing.
At this time the parties may agree to a mitigation or abatement of rent to
avoid trial, in which case a praecipe would terminate the case. It is un-
likely, however, that such agreement could be reached.
In situation #5 where legal defenses are raised, a fact-finding hearing
would be held, after which the examiner would make preliminary findings
and recommendations. The parties could agree to these findings and rec-
ommendations, in which case a praecipe would be entered to that effect,
or they could challenge either the findings or the recommendations, or
both, in which case it would be certified to the court for trial. In those
instances where cases were certified for trial, the examiner would also make
a preliminary determination as to the advisability of protective orders56
requiring money to be placed in escrow pending outcome of the suit.57
These orders would be reviewable the same day by the court.
55. See Comment, Rent Mitigation For Housing Code Violations, 56 IOwA L. REv.
460 (1970). For a discussion of the New York experience, see Note, Abatement of
Rent in New York, 17 SYRAcusE L. REv. 490 (1966).
56. The serious legal considerations regarding the deposits which are ordered to
be made into the court registry are beyond the scope of this article. However, the
law in the District of Columbia, prior to Lindsey, has been that such deposits are
to be ordered only in "limited circumstances" and the cases have emphasized the ne-
cessity of a judicial decision based upon specific findings. See Blanks v. Fowler, 437
F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1970), supplemental opinion, No. 24,548 (Jan. 12, 1971); Bell
v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Cooks v. Fowler, 437 F.2d
669 (D.C. Cir. 1970) supplemental opinion, No. 24,546 (Jan. 12, 1971). In Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), the Court in dictum approved such requirements. See
also Comment, Landlord Protective Orders-A Lack of Guidelines for Appellate Use,
9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 132 (1971).
57. The use of escrow deposits by tenants protesting housing code violations has
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One of the major problems in the court at present is the one of default
judgments. 58 It is major in its dimension, not in its strain upon the system.
Numerous theories have been advanced attempting to explain the problem,
the most frequent being the adequacy of notice."a Since no one knew for
sure what the real causes were, it was difficult to attempt a solution. Under
the system as designed this summer, if a tenant or his attorney failed to
show, a default was entered, as is presently done, but this could be set
aside at the trial date (which was a different date than the hearing). If
the tenant showed for the trial, he would be referred to the examiner and
the process described above would begin on an expedited basis. If he
did not appear, a default judgment would be entered at the date of trial.
This obviously does not solve the problem, since the inequities are still
present, but the only solution that was advanced was that of providing serv-
ice through certified mail. Admittedly the problem was left in limbo
because of the unknowns.
Will It Work?
In a moment of unnatural bureaucratic candor, the research staff could not
answer the question. They simply did not know. The difficultly of de-
signing a system-any system-is that it is generally done in a vacuum.
In spite of the fact that a number of representatives from all concerned
areas were contacted for their input and criticism (constructive and other-
wise), most were generally neutral in their attitudes. Neighborhood Legal
Services Program staff members were highly critical however.60 They saw
in the proposal elements of racism, increased judicial disinterestedness, and a
reversal (however subtle) of tenants' rights. They saw the interest of judi-
cial economy and procedural efficiency as an end rather than as a means
to a higher quality of justice which the system was intended to produce.
The NLSP staff did pinpoint one problem-judicial attitude-which may
be at the heart of many other problems in the court. But they failed to
an indirect effect of showing the tenants' good faith in not paying the rent due. This
is sometimes dubious in situations of rent strikes or rent withholding, in that, it has
happened that by the time judgments are handed down, the rent owed is not available
since it has been spent on more pressing needs. This recently happened after a series
of rent strikes in the District of Columbia in 1970. By depositing money into escrow,
the landlord is assured of back rent should he win, even though he does not presently
have use of it. See generally 1970 Wis. L. REV. 607.
58. See supra note 48.
59.. This problem was one of the more serious that the staff attempted to deal with,
since before a solution could be formed, the full scope and cause of the problem had
to be understood. See also supra note 48.
60. See Neighborhood Report supra note 3. The local legal services program han-
dles about 14,000 cases per year and has been in existence since 1964. The Washing-
ton Post, Feb. 8, 1973, § D, at 1, col, 8.
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realize that no system, short of divine appointment, will rid the administra-
tion of justice of the problem. It is present in the civil and criminal divi-
sions; it is inherent in any system that allows one man to judge other men.
Many of the obvious injustices, such as the lack of adequate code enforce-
ment complained of in the NLSP proposal, are not problems with which the
court itself can deal. Most require either executive initiative or legislative
action. For example, NLSP recommended that Landlord and Tenant
Court be elevated to the status of a division rather than a branch of the
court. This is quite definitely a legitimate matter, one which the court
has no power to effect. Other proposals merit discussion:
(1) Upgrading physical facilities and judicial attitudes-the physical
facilities are undignified, but this is a budgetary consideration which has
been often requested but always severely limited if not denied; judicial
attitudes are not changed by judicial fiat;
(2) Assigning judges to hear cases on a 3-6 months rotating basis-a
longer period on the bench has been seriously considered, but it cuts as a
two-edged sword, and the overwhelming reluctance of the judges to such an
assignment, while advising against such a move, may be indicative of the
judicial attitude complained of;
(3) Studying the problem of defaults and improving notification pro-
cedures-this suggestion is presently being acted upon;61
(4) Providing for an initial briefing by trained personnel-this is in-
cluded in the proposal;
(5) Establishing a full panoply of civil remedies-this is essentially
a legislative function which has been strongly urged and which was antici-
pated in the Housing Court system, but presently is a jurisdictional prob-
lem so long as criminal penalties are attached to code violations;
(6) Establishing evening and Saturday morning sessions-this was
also suggested by the committee;
(7) Providing allowance for all counterclaims-this is a legislative
problem over which the court has no jursidiction;
62
(8) Establishing mediation as a voluntary service-this was also sug-
gested as part of the system;
(9) Developing a closer liaison with the Department of Licenses and In-
spections-under the proposed system inspectors would be specially assigned
to the office of the hearing examiner;
(10) Requiring the landlord's attorney to inform the court of the cur-
rent state of the tenant's account before issuing a default judgment-this
61. See supra note 48.
62. Compare Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). See also note 53 supra.
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is reasonable in light of the practices complained of by NLSP and could
be accomplished by court rule;
(11) Enforcing a requirement that the plaintiff's suit be dismissed for
want of prosecution if the landlord's attorney does not asnwer the initial
call-failure to answer at initial call should be subject to the same result
as default and such a procedure is appropriate for court rule, providing
that default and dismissal are both later allowed to be set aside should the
party appear.
(12) Providing for limited discovery-this would seem appropriate
since the Landlord and Tenant Court is a branch of the Civil Division, and
discovery, similar to that in civil cases, could be allowed by court rule;
(13) Providing for automatic certification of cases to the assignment
commissioner upon the filing of a jury demand-until the Supreme Court
passes on the question of the right to jury trial in Landlord and Tenant court
proceedings, this suggestion cannot be acted upon.
These comments to the NLSP recommendations are not meant in any
way to belittle their merit with flippant answers. Legal Services attorneys
are faced everyday with the shortcomings of a system in which they seek
a modicum of justice for their clients. However, their suggestions were not
proposals for a more efficient system which could improve the quality of jus-
tice. No alternatives, only criticisms of the system were proposed.
Surrounding areas have attempted to deal with the same problem of
landlord and tenant proceedings with mixed success in the past year.68
What is really needed is a complete legislative reappraisal of the present
system, incorporating the recommendations of law reform groups.6 4  To
date slumlordism has become more and more of a problem, 65 and
the tenants' position vis-h-vis the law a tenuous one at best.6 6 Until an effort
63. See supra note 16, and accompanying text.
64. See generally Dooley & Goldberg, A Model Tenants' Remedies Act, 7 HARV.
J. LEGIS. 357 (1970); Garrity, Redesigning Landlord-Tenant Concepts for an Urban
Society, 46 J. URBAN LAW 695 (1969); Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Ten-
ant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM
L. REV. 225 (1969); Symposium, Tenant-Landlord, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 243 (1970);
Comment, A National Landlord-Tenant Relations Act: A Legislative Proposal for the
1970's, 3 AKRON L. REv. 69 (1969). See also studies cited supra note 16.
65. See generally Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869
(1967); Note, Housing Code Violations and the Tort of Slumlordism, 8 HOUSTON L.
REV. 522 (1971). But see Blum & Dunham, Slumlordism as a Tort-A Dissenting
View, 66 MICH. L. REv. 451 (1968).
66. See generally Roisman, Tenants and the Law: 1970, 20 AM. U. L. REV. 58
(1970). It is only a matter of time before the impact of Lindsey v. Normet is felt
through judicial interpretation or legislative action. See Note, Lindsey v. Normet:




is made which reduces the disparity of justice dispensed in the Landlord
and Tenant Court and the judicial machinery becomes a responsive mechan-
ism for that justice, tenants will remain disenfranchised as a class from that
justice.
Judicial Attention and Response
The proposed reorganization of the Landlord and Tenant Court is not and
was not meant to be the ultimate panacea for all that ails the system. It
was an attempt to meet some of the major problems head-on in an effort
to reduce the present inequities. As mentioned above, the general response
of the community at large was apathetic and less than concretely construc-
tive. This apathy may have been borne by the generalized frustration
which usually accompanies any attempt to modify an unwieldy bureauc-
racy; it may also have been the result of a common belief that what was
said would not actually make any difference in the end. The author
questions whether those involved in the community actually considered the
Chief Judge to be serious in his desire for reform.
The Chief Judge was not only serious, he was determined to rectify,
as best he could, marshalling what talents and ideas were available, the
system about which so many complained. He appointed a five-judge spe-
cial subcommittee to consider the proposals, hear testimony, and arrive at a
consensus as to the most desirable system. Hearings were held in Novem-
ber and December during which the testimony of twenty-four persons rep-
resenting various interested groups was given.17  It was not until almost
two months later that the Board of Judges Special Landlord and Tenant
Committee reported its findings in a disappointing four-page memorandum
to the Chief Judge.6 8 Given the magnitude of the task and the impor-
tance of the work, the final report demonstrated either a disinterest on the
part of the committee or a lack of understanding of the operation of the
proposed system. The general findings and recommendations of the Com-
mittee were:
(1) That the use of hearing examiners (which the committee likened to
administrative law judges) would require a different delineation of power
than is the common practice;
(2) That the system of hearing examiners was unworkable, would de-
prive the tenants and landlords of "judicial presence", and superimpose
one more layer of procedure;
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(3) That prior to trial, greater recourse, should be had and greater utiliza-
tion made of the Landlord and Tenant Consultant Service;
(4) That the court should have a staff of housing inspectors attached to
and paid by the court;
(5) That appropriate forms should be made available and assistance pro-
vided for the tenant to answer the complaint should he or she desire, and
therein raise any defenses which may be valid;
(6) That the office of the Clerk of the Landlord and Tenant Court have
an increase in its staff so as to double the existing staff;
(7) That the abuses of service of process should be investigated and dealt
with;
(8) That landlords be required to certify the non-existence of code
violations as a pre-condition for filing suit.
The Committee deferred action on a number of other problems until
some indeterminate future date.69 The report included a minority report
of Judge Taylor, joined by Judge Doyle,70 which supported the concept of
a hearing examiner. It was the minority report's summation of the powers
of the hearings examiner which more closely approximated the original in-
tention and staff proposal. It is the author's opinion that the role of the
hearing examiner and the powers delegated to him were not clearly under-
stood by many of those commenting upon it. While the majority felt that
the system was "unworkable", 71 there was no indication of how this conclu-
sion had been reached. It is also apparent that the concept was not clearly
understood when the majority states in recommendation (3) that recourse
should be had to LTCS without realizing that such a referral was part of the
69. The Committee stated:
Other suggestions-such as having landlord and tenant sessions at night and
having the landlord and tenant judge start sitting during the first call of the
calendar, so as to be personally available in an assignment capacity, much as
a examiner would do, in part-need to be looked into at a future date.
Id. at 4. The Chief Judge responded to these suggestions by noting that the first
had been tried unsuccessfully in 1967 when it was found that 75 percent of the judge's
time was unoccupied. He also pointed out that having the judge take the bench at
calendar call had been the practice for several years. Chief Judge Greene stated that:
This practice was changed only when it was concluded that his somnolent
presence during the monotonous call demeaned the judicial function rather
than to enhance it, and the Court was subject to frequent and pointed criti-
cism on this account.
Memorandum of the Chief Judge to the Committee on Landlord and Tenant Reorgani-
zation at 5 (March 5, 1973).
70. Memorandum of Judge Taylor to Judge Margaret A. Haywood, Chairman, Special
Landlord and Tenant Committee (Feb. 22, 1973). It should be noted, however, that
Judge Taylor also signed the Report of Committee on Landlord & Tenant Court Reor-
ganization.
71. Id. at 1.
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tasks outlined for the examiner. It is also interesting that while the Com-
mittee expects a greater use of LTCS, no supplemental funds for increased
staffing was recommended.
The Committee did adopt the idea of having housing inspectors attached
to the court, but did not define exactly how they were to be used as offi-
cers of the court during a court proceeding. Presumably they would be
called by the court, rather than by either party in the suit, to testify as to
their findings. In addition to the housing inspectors, the only additional
staff recommended was an increase for the clerk's office. Unfortunately,
although the clerk's office is understaffed, it was not the most critical of
personnel shortages. As mentioned before, nothing was said as to increas-
ing the staff of LTCS, nor adding an additional judge to the court, nor em-
ploying paraprofessionals to assist the tenants or the court. The staff of the
clerk's office did not need to be doubled; it needed to be computerized as
the other branches of the Superior Court are being computerized. The
tremendous amount of a paper shuffled through the office can be much bet-
ter managed if the clerk were given the equipment he needs at a much re-
duced expense.
In effect the Committee recommended nothing which was not already
being done or contemplated in the way of court reorganization. Its recom-
mendations left the Landlord and Tenant Court still floundering in the
morass of paper and delay, and left justice as illusory as it always was.
The lack of any substantive proposal for reorganization also left the Chief
Judge in a rather obvious quandry, since he had appointed the Committee.
Given the amount of time and the number of witnesses testifying and the
material submitted, it could be presumed that the Committee would be able
to understand the complexities of the problem as well as the subtleties of
the proposals, and thus its recommendations would be well-reasoned and
appropriate. Unfortunately, the Chief Judge was caught in the position of
having to criticize the Committee he had established to deal with the prob-
lem. This is not meant to say that the Committee was to be a rubber-stamp
for what had been proposed. The Chief Judge had hoped that the exper-
tise the Committee would develop as a result of their work would en-
able them to arrive at a recommendation for a system which was both work-
able as well as designed to meet the needs of the court. It was obvious
that, in the end, this was not the case. The final report was totally inade-
quate. Consequently the Chief Judge wrote to the Committee:
However, as you know, it is my general practice to support com-
mittee recommendations to the Board of Judges even if I have
some disagreement with them. However, in this case, inasmuch
as the subject matter was originally proposed in a public speech
1973]
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I made after long and careful consideration-a speech that was
based not only on my own observations but also on those of a
number of other judges-and inasmuch as the committee report
departs radically from the goals I had in mind, it will not be pos-
sible for me to support the Committee's conclusions.
7 2
The Chief Judge regarded the central problem in the Landlord and Ten-
ant Court as "one which would rectify serious problems of unfairness in that
Branch arising from the imbalance created when one side has legal repre-
sentation and the other does not."'7 3  This imbalance, as the Chief Judge
pointed out, would not be ameliorated merely by diverting tenants to LTCS
which would require a massive infusion of funds and staff to handle the
cases.74
The Chief Judge also rejected the Committee's disapproval of the hearing
examiner concept, and indicated that it has been used successfully else-
where. 75 In those jurisdictions, the decision of the hearing examiner is final
unless clearly erroneous or contrary to law, and the demands for trial de
novo are very infrequent. The focus is upon expertise in the area of land-
lord and tenant law as well as the practical realities of tenancy in the Dis-
trict of Columbia. With the aid of the housing inspectors and the exper-
tise gathered from litigation before him, the examiner would be able to sift
quickly through much of the factual data submitted to him and arrive at a
just result.
The Chief Judge pointed out that his proposal had met with unanimous
approval of the City Council and that the Mayor had specially marked it as
one of the two new programs which should be funded notwithstanding the
general retrenchment of the budget.78 Additionally, the Chief Judge addressed
himself to a few of the other problem areas and suggestions which the Com-
72. Memorandum of the Chief Judge to the Committee on Landlord and Tenant Re-
organization at 1 (March 5, 1973).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2. The Chief Judge also pointed out that
. . . there is something inappropriate in the suggestion that most defendants
probably have no legal defense anyway and that they might as well be di-
verted to a social agency in advance of an adjudication of their legal rights. Id.
75. The Chief Judge stated:
Hearing examiners function not only in administrative agencies where they
typically handle complex matters, but they are not unknown as adjuncts of
courts. Examples that come readily to mind are the hearing examiners at-
tached to the Court of Claims who often try extremely complicated actions in-
volving millions of dollars; examiners who try most traffic violations in New
York City, arbitrators in such places as Philadelphia who decide negligence
matters; and the thirty or forty hearing examiners attached to the Superior
Court of Los Angeles who make decisions in a whole variety of cases.
Id. at 1-2.
76. Id. at 4.
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mittee made. He strongly criticized the Committee's suggestion that the
staff in the Landlord and Tenant clerk's office be doubled at the expense
of nearly $50,000 as being completely out of balance with the entire pro-
posed court budget.
77
In conclusion, the Chief Judge stated:
S..I am not convinced that the Committee's posture or ap-
proach are [sic] correct, and accordingly I shall ask the Board
of Judges to endorse the following program:
(1) If the Congress approves the budget item reproduced on
page 4 of this memorandum [$117,343], the Superior Court
will establish a Landlord-Tenant Hearing Commissioner Section
with two hearing commisssioners, investigators, and appropriate
supporting personnel.
(2) The function and powers of the hearing commissioners shall
be established by Court Rule, such Rule to incorporate the princi-
ple that the decision of a hearing examiner shall be binding un-
less clearly erroneous or contrary to law, in which event the
parties shall be entitled to a trial de novo before a judge of this
Court.
(3) The functions and powers of the investigatiors shall like-
wise be established by Court Rule, such Rule to incorporate the
principle that an investigator shall inspect premises which are the
subject of landlord-tenant litigation either on motion of a party
or on motion of the hearing examiner with a view to rendering
a report with respect to the existence of housing code violations
and their apparent origin.78
On April 6, 1973, the Board of Judges adopted the Chief Judge's recom-
mendations. 79  However, Congress must first approve the budget request
before the system can be implemented, and undoubtedly the legality of the
system will be challenged as has been the case elsewhere when new proce-
dures have been attempted. The crucial testing of the temper of the sys-
tem will come with its implementation, since it is only then that a realistic
appraisal can be made, rather than in the vacuum of theory and legal anal-
ysis. The step which the Chief Judge has taken is a bold one, and one long
overdue. It remains to be seen whether it will meet up to the expectations.
77. Id. at 4-5.
78. Id. at 6-7.
79. The Washington Post, April 1, 1973, § B, at 1, col. 1.
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